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THE ROAD TO THE "WAR OF GREATER EAST ASIA"
By K. H. ABSHAGEN
On December 8 war broke out in tho Pac-jfic. We have asked ou-r
Tokl/o collaborator to describe the 1'oa4 to this war 011 tllO basis of his
observations as a ;ournalut in the Japanese capital and taking into
account the docum~l1ItaTtl material published dlLring the last few weeks.
(Som6 of it is to b6 found in our documentarl/ append'ix.)
Mr. K. H. Abshagon is known to o-ur readers by his penetrat-
ing and amus-ing article "Soc-jety Dies Ha-rd" -in OlLr December issue.-K.M.
What is it that was responsible for
the bitter hostility of the United States
towards Japan, a hostility which has
now culminated in war? Is it to be
found in the economic field'/ Hardly.
The stake of the United States in
China was small compared with British
interests, and American exports to
Japan over a long period of time have
been from two to four times as high
88 those to China. Japan has been
one of the United States' best cus-
tomers.
And yet, since the days when
Townsend Harris, the first United States
consular and diplomatic envoy to Japan,
complained of what he regarded as
duplicity and ill-willed procrastination
on the part of the Japanese negotiators,
the road of Japanese-American re-
lations lu"ls been strewn with boulders
of misunderstanding and reciprocal
misrepresentation of motives and in-
tentions.
It would be too simple to try and
explain these misunderstandings merely
by an alleged incompatibility of Eastern
and Western ideas. What we are
witnessing is the final clash of two
very definite national mentalities.
THE MISS10NARY SPIRIT
Ever since the United States in the
nineteenth century began to take an
interest in areas beyond their own
far-flung frontiers and commenced com-
mercial and diplomatic activities in
the Far East, these activities have
been permeated with a strong mis-
sionary spirit. It is more than mere
chance that the majority of Christian
missionaries in China and Japan are
Americans and that there is no region
in the whole world where American
missionaries are so numerous as in the
Far East. One would do the great
majority of these workers in the Lord's
vineyard grave wrong if one doubted
the purity of their intentions. On the
other hand, very many of them, com-
ing as they did into the domains of a
civilization many centuries older than
their own with the fixed idea of saving
poor illiterate heathens, must have had
an exasperating effect on the people
whom they carne to save.
The Chinese with their innate sense
of humor succeeded in making the best
of it, deriving what advantage they
could from the works of the mis-
sionaries, particularly their hospitals,
schools, and universities. Moreover,
they made very clever use of mis-
sionary organizations as a channel for
their own propaganda in the United
States, in the same way that they
succeeded in making Geneva, as long
as it lasted, a powerful sounding-board
for their complaints and desires.
The Japanese, on the other hand, a
people who derive their origin from
heaven, never took very kindly to the
missionaries and their works. Their
pride forbade them to curry favor
with them; their insularity of outlook
made them underrate the political value
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of the propaganda organ at their
disposaL Thus from the outset the
missionaries became a powerful factor
in China's favor, which at the
same time was bound, unintentionally,
to influence public opinion in the
United States in a manner unfavorable
to Japan.
All this might not have been of
decisive importance. However, it is an
undeniable fact that the whole diplo-
macy of the United States has carried
the stamp of being quasi-missionary.
Nothing has been more exasperating
to the Japanese mind than the oft-
repeated enunciation of general prin-
ciples by successive administrations in
Washington. From John Hay's Open
Door notes in 1899 to Elihu Root's
revised draft of the four Balfour
Principles in 1922; from Henry
Stimson's "idealistic" interference with
the Manchukuo and Shanghai affairs in
1931 and 1932 to Cordell Hull's recent
statements of principles, there exists a
long series of pronouncements of the
successive United StatES administrations,
most of them full of self-righteousness,
all of them saturated with good in-
tentions, high principles, and moral
superiority.
MUTUAL SUSPICION
The Japanese might have taken
more kindly to such lecturing if they
had been able to believe in its sincerity.
But the demand for the Open Door in
China was accompanied from a very
early date by the erection of higher
and ever higher legal fences against
the immigration of Japanese and their
enjoyment of equal rights in the
United States. Furthermore, while
America assumed the right to criticize
Japan's measures in Manchukuo and
China, what is generally called
"Dollar Diplomacy" was carried on in
the Latin American countries, if pos-
sible with even less disguise than be-
fore. The enforcement of anti-
Japanese trade policies in a number of
South American states during the last
few months under US pressure and
the ejection of the recalcitrant Pres-
ident of Panama are the most recent
examples.
On the other hand, Japan's declared
policy of a New Order in East Asia
has not found a sympathetic echo on
the other side of the Pacific. America
has never believed in the sincerity
with which Japan regards her mission
in East Asia. She has seen in it
only the camouflage for a rapacious
imperialism.
UNREQUITED LOVE
In addition to all this, the history
of Japanese-American relations is the
old, old story of unrequited love.
When Japan in the Meiji Era began
to adopt Western technical civilization,
it was primarily to the United States
that she went for instruction and
models. American high schools, uni-
versities, and technical colleges trained
many of the men who became the
leading spirits in the wholesale in-
troduction of new industrial methods
and processes into a land that for
centuries had been intentionally cut
off from every intercourse with the
outside world. Strong sympathy for
America continued to exist in Japan
in spite of American discrimination
against Japanese, in spite also of the
long series of disagreements in the
naval disarmament conferences and
the refusal of naval parity by the
Anglo-Saxon powers. I t is a small yet
significant item that Townsend Harris,
who laboriously negotiated and con-
cluded the first commercial treaty
between his own country and Japan,
is an almost forgotten man in America,
while his memory is to this day alive
and honored in Japan. On the eastern
shores of the Pacific, the echo to
Japanese sympathy, expressed and un-
expressed, has been weak. A strong
current of pro-Chinese sentiment has
long dominated public opinion in
America. Indeed, it has been so strong
that it probably decisively influenced
the negotiations of last autumn at
various stages, for the Washington
administration would not have dared
face the public with any agreement
which, by J apanophobe propaganda,
could have been represented as "selling
four hundred million Chinese down
the river."
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THE CHINA INCIDENT
It is against such a background as
this that the attempts at conciliation
must be judged. For a considerable
time before the beginning of the
Washington negotiations last April,
Japanese - American relations had been
going from bad to worse. Since the
exchange of messages between Koki
Hirota and Cordell Hull, at the
former's initiative, in 1934, a more
cordial atmosphere had prevailed for
a time between the two countries, an
atmosphere which had not even been
too badly influenced by the final
breakdown of the naval agreement in
1935. Immediately after the outbreak
of hostilities in China in 1937, how-
ever, a new deterioration set in. The
first reaction of the American Govern-
ment after the outbreak of hostilities
was a statement by Secretary of
State Cordell Hull (July 16, 1937)
limited to generalities: condemning
"the use of force" and the "interference
in the internal affairs of other na-
tions"; advocating "faithful observance
of international agreements" and mak-
ing the modification of treaties subject
to "orderly processes carried out in a
spirit of mutual helpfulness and ac·
commodation" without specific refer-
ence to the Far East. But meanwhile
the Pa.11.aY incident had inflamed anti-
Japanese feelings in the United States,
and the continued fighting in China
resulted in more and more open sup-
port of the Chiang Kai-shek Govern-
ment on the part of America.
ENTER THE NEW ORDER
In the diplomatic exchanges that
went parallel to the military events,
the American Government based its
various protests and claims mainly on
the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. In
her note of November 18, 1933, Japan
stated that there was no intention of
interfering with American rights and
interests in China. For the first time
sbe made it clear that she could not
allow the New Order in China, which
she was trying to establish, to be
hampered by the dead letter of a
diplomatic document; for this docu-
ment had become obsolete through
developments which, at the time of
the conclusion of the treaty, had
been unforeseeable. This difference of
opinion in the years 1937 and 1938 is
typical of the attitudes of the two
sides such as can be observed in all
the following negotiations up to the
final events in the winter of 1941.
TWO VIEWS ON EUROPE
A new element was introduced into
Japanese-American relations when Ja-
pan, in September 1940, signed the
Tripartite Pact with Germany and
Italy. It will be useful to remember
that, from the very beginning, a
fundamental difference can be observed
between the two valuations of this
pact-Japan's on the one hand and the
United States' on the other. This
difference is in turn closely connected
with the policy of both states in re-
lation to the question of the limitation
or extension of the war in Europe.
Japan consistently followed a policy of
concentration on her own immediate
aims in the Far Eastern sphere. She
made no use of Britain's weakness
after Dunkirk to obtain, either by
threats or by main force, British
territories in China or the Malay
Peninsula; nor did she even undertake
a great commercial drive into parts
of the globe where the industries of
the European belligerents were now
hampered by blockade and counter-
blockade. Japan's adherence to the
Tripartite Pact, in the light of events
between its conclusion and the out-
break of the present war in the
Pacific, seems to have been dictated by
the desire to limit the European con-
flict, to avoid a clash in the Pacific,
and to concentrate all her forces on
the establishment of what has become
known as the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, with as little inter-
ference as possible from outside.
The United States, on the other
hand, or at least Pre ident Roosevelt,
militantly unfurled the banner of
democracy from the very beginning of
the war in Europe. As time went on
it became increasingly clear that, even
at the time when the Neutrality Legis-
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lation was still nominally valid, the
Washington administration was taking
not only an active but a leading part
in the fight against the European Axis
powers. The question was only how
quickly the forming of American public
opinion- subjected to a powerful inter-
ventionist publicity campaign from the
White House-and the transfer of
American industry from peace to war
production would permit the full and
open participation of the United States
in the war. This is why the United
States Government regarded the Tri-
partite Pact as a menace to its own
war policy and has been trying, un-
successfully, to undermine Japan's
loyalty to its Axis partners in Europe.
WASHINGTON PROCLAIMS
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In the series of negotiations which
began last April, Washington took the
initiative with a dra,ft proposal ranging
over a wide field of political and eco-
nomic problems. Though the details of
this proposal are not so far available,
from the Summary of the Negotiations
published by the Japanese Government
it can be assumed that the general
principles proclaimed by Cordell Hull
in July 1937 and which descend in a
direct line from John Hay's Open Door
notes were again extolled. But this
time they were coupled-the Japanese
Summary is definite on this point-
with the demand that Japan should
undertake not to go to war in the
Pacific against the United States should
the latter participate in the war in
Europe "in self-defense." The only
other detail of the American draft
propOsal available so far is that the
US Government offered to use its good
offices to initiate peace negotiations
between Japan and Chungking "on such
terms as were acceptable to the United
States." Obviously the US Government
was not prepared to accept the J apa-
nese conception of the New Order in
East Asia. Yet the Japanese Govern-
ment agreed to negotiate.
THE KONOYE MESSAGE
The danger of a complete breakdown
arose when in July the Japanese con-
cluded the agreement for the common
defense of French Indo-China, and, ac-
cording to its terms, garrisoned J apan-
ese troops in southern Indo-China.
Prince Konoye, however, made a fur-
ther determined attempt to save the
negotiations. In his message to Presi-
dent Roosevelt last August, he suggested
a personal meeting with the President,
but the US Government, putting the
cart before the horse, insisted that
agreement on fundamentals and essen-
tials must precede such a meeting. It
was at this stage that in circles inside
and outside of the Japanese Government
the suspicion became almost a certainty
that the US Government was not serious
in its desire to reach an agreement,
the more so since the military prepara-
tions directed by all the countries of
the ABCD front against Japan were
steadily increasing in intensity. In
spite of this the Japanese Government
repeatedly submitted new proposals,
and the Tojo Cabinet, though at its
formation branded by the Anglo-Saxon
Press as a war cabinet, went even
further in its concessions to United
States demands than any of its pre-
decessors.
The only result was that, after re-
peated exchange of draft proposals and
conversations, in which Ambassador
Kurusu took part, Secretary Hull on
November 26 handed the Japanese
negotiators a memorandum which the
Japanese considered a slap in the face.
From the very proposals contained in
this document and the inquiries ad-
dressed concurrently to the Japanese
side by Undersecretary Sumner Welles
in President Roosevelt's name, it seems
as if the US Government thought Tokyo
would anyway eventually accept what-
ever Washington demanded. The un-
preparedness of the US Pacific Fleet
when the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor seems to bear out this inter-
pretation of the intentions behind the
Hull Memorandum of November 26.
FACTS VS. PREACHING
But let us return for a moment to
the substance of the negotiations as
far as it can be gauged from avail-
able information. The Japanese Press
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reflecting, it may be assumed, the of-
ficial viewpoint, repeatedly complained,
during the weeks preceding the final
breakdown, that the American side
continued to propound generalities and
failed to face the real situation in East
Asia. The data contained in the doc-
uments published by the Japanese
Government on the whole bear out the
contention that, to every attempt on
Japan's part to come down to the re-
alities of the situation, the US Govern-
ment replied in the tone of the priest
talking down to the sinner, preaching
in the best-or worst-missionary style.
However, the various American pro-
posals and counterproposals, besides
the enunciation of general principles,
contain some concrete suggestions
which allow one to judge of Washington's
underlying intentions. There was first
the question of the Tripartite Pact.
Washington demanded nothing less
than denunciation de jure or at least
de fa,cto of a treaty freely signed and
especially solemnized by an Imperial
Rescript. In this the United States
Government not only clearly over-
reached itself, but acted in a manner
which does not tally with the oft-
repeated American pronouncements in
favor of unconditional observance of
international treaties.
OLD FRIEND IN NEW GUISE
Next there was Washington's insist-
ence on the "principle of non-dis-
crimination in international commercial
relations "-old friend Open Door in
new guise. Here the Japanese Govern-
ment turned the tables on the United
States by recognizing the principle to
be applied to the whole Pacific area,
including Chi.na, on the understanding
that it also be applied to the rest of
the world. But the Roosevelt Govern-
ment finds general principles useful
only as long as they fit into its own
plans or apply to other nations, while
it is not willing to submit its own
actions to the same standards. Un-
conditional acceptance of the Open Door
policy in China, coupled with what the
Japanese call joint international con-
trol of China: such were the demands
which were brought forward in anSwer
to Japan's compromise formula - de-
mands which, if accepted, would have
meant the end of Japan's New Order
and of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
In the third question, that of the
evacuation of Japanese troops from
China and French Indo-China, the
Japanese Government went as far as
could be expected of a proud military
nation. In her proposals of November
20 Japan offered to remove her troops
stationed in southern Indo-China to
the north of the country, upon con-
clusion of the proposed agreement, to
show that she was not planning further
military expansion toward the south.
Cordell Hull's answer, however, was
the blunt demand for total with-
drawal of all Japanese troops from
China and Indo-China. It is difficult
to imagine how any responsible person
in Washington could have believed that
Japan would or could accede to such
demands, unless, as we suggested be-
fore, he assumed that Japan had been
weakened by economic warfare and
encirclement to the point where she
would swallow practically anything.
THE ROLE OF' GREAT BRITAIN
There remain two further points in
the last phase of the Washington
conversations, regarding which the
documentary evidence so far available
admits only of guesswork. There is in
the first place the question of the part
played by the other members of the
ABCD front, especially that played by
the British Empire. And secondly
there are the reasons for the sudden
stiffening - to breaking-point - of
Washington's attitude as expressed in
the Hull Memorandum of November 26
following the more accommodating,
though never - from the Japanese
viewpoint - satisfactory proposals
brought forward by the American
negotiators during the preceding ex-
changes. There is reason to believe
that these two questions are closely
related.
It is not by accident or willful
omission that we have so far dealt
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almost exclusively with the Japanese-
American angle of the problem. As a
matter of fact, the role played by
Great Britain during the whole course
of the negotiations has been that of a
vassal state to the United States.
Great Britain and the British Do-
minions at every single moment of the
controversy took their cue from Wash-
ington. They followed suit when
Washington opened economic warfare
against Japan, and they did not even
try to take an active part in the
negotiations but were satisfied to give
Washington their views, if any, in
private. All this in spite of the fact
that it was easily discernible from a
glance at the British press during the
critical stages of the Washington talks
that Great Britain, for more than one
reason, was in deadly fear of open
conflict in the Pacific; for, whatever
its outcome, it was bound to put an
end to her powerful political and
economic position in China and reduce
to nought the hundreds of million
pounds sterling invested in Shanghai
and the Yangtse valley as well as in
Hongkong.
JAPAN'S CHOICE
The Netherlands East Indies, under
the influence of the refugee government
of Holland in London, followed the
British example. And one might say
here that Japan did not even try the
policy of divide et impera by seeking
direct negotiations with one of the
weaker partners of the ABCD front.
She took the bull by the horns and,
with Oriental patience and thorough-
ness, outwardly unmoved but inwardly
forgetting nothing, carried on the
negotiations with the United States to
the bitter end. The last hope went
with Cordell Hull's Memorandum of
November 26, and with the President's
refusal to consider a three-months'
stopgap agreement for a further
attempt to surmount the crisis.
On November 29 the United
Press reported from Washington: "The
United States yesterday took an ap-
parently immovable position in the
face of the acute Far Eastern crisis,
insisting on maintenance of the status
quo together with removal of Japanese
influence in China and French Indo-
China. The highest authoritative
quarters in the Government stated that
the question of continued peace in the
Pacific depends on whether Japan
responds at the last moment to
American efforts to induce her to
fulfill this program. The highest
Government source said that no com-
promise was possible on the China
question, thereby crushing Japanese
hopes for a stopgap agreement whereby
Japan would hold her present gains but
would not attempt new aggressions,"
The idea of such a temporary agree-
ment during the month preceding the
breakdown of the negotiations had been
repeatedly mooted by diplomats in
Washington and Tokyo. By openly
dropping this idea just one day after
the handing of the Hull Memorandum,
the President made it quite clear that
he wanted a decision one way or the
other and that there was no alternative
for Japan other than "ar or submis-
sion.
What induced the President to take
that stand, we, again, can only guess.
But to all appearances it is more than
mere chance that, in the days im-
mediately preceding the fateful de-
Cisions in Washington, the Chungking
Ambassador was particularly active
and made no secret of his determina-
tion to do his utmost to prevent any
agreement between Japan and the
United States, even a temporary one
for three months, if necessary by the
threat of Chiang Kai-shek's secession
from the ABCD camp. We have
already said that Washington could ill
afford to run foul of the pro-Chinese
propaganda in America. And so it
seems that the moderating counsel
from Britain, offered in ca?ne1'a only,
was of no avail.
War became inevitable. Again, as in
the case of Germany and the USSR, it
was a question of speed against mass.
On December 8 Japan struck quick
and hard. The "War of Greater East
Asia" was on.
